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FOREWORD

In this timely monograph, General Barry McCaffrey,
USA (Retired), the former Director of National Drug
Control Policy, argues that Colombia’s 40 million citizens
must not be deserted by their neighbors. Leaving the
Colombians to deal in isolation with a pervasive drug
problem will deeply affect all 800 million of us in the
Western Hemisphere through addiction, violence, and
corruption. Moreover, he argues that the United States and
the entire international community must support a
long-term commitment to Plan Colombia and to building
cooperative multinational approaches to the tough
drug-associated problems that face us all. This is an
undertaking in which we all have an equal stake and an
equal responsibility.
This monograph is the last of a special series stemming
from a major conference held in Miami, Florida, on
February 1-2, 2001. That conference, entitled
“Implementing Plan Colombia: Strategic and Operational
Imperatives,” was cosponsored by the Dante B. Fascell
North-South Center at the University of Miami and the
Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.
The intent was to clarify issues, focus the debate, and learn
from it. General McCaffrey was the keynote speaker at the
dinner meeting of that conference. We are pleased to
contribute to a resolution of Colombia’s, the hemisphere’s,
and the global community’s problems through greater
dialogue and debate.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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PREFACE

Retired U.S. Army General Barry R. McCaffrey has
never been a person to mince his words. In approaching the
multifaceted and tragic dilemma of Colombia, he warns us
not to forget that the problems of that country affect the
entire Western Hemisphere. The global criminal enterprise
of the illegal drug industry reaches into all of our
neighborhoods. Yet the Hemisphere, says McCaffrey, “is in
a state of denial.” Until now, drugs have been seen as
someone else’s problem.
When McCaffrey took off his general’s uniform in 1996 to
join the president’s cabinet as Director of National Drug
Control Policy, he laid down two markers which he has
repeated with great consistency. The first is that the drug
problem in this country should be understood primarily as a
problem of demand, not supply. The second is that it is
inaccurate to talk of a “war on drugs.” Wars, he said shortly
after taking office, can be fought and won if armies have the
resources and the will to fight. Would that the drug problem
were so simple. McCaffrey compares it more to the search to
cure cancer. In attacking the demand side, for which he had
to fight continuously for more congressional funding,
McCaffrey can claim success. Adolescent drug use, he points
out, declined by 21 percent just over the last 2 years.
But ultimate success is not so close at hand. As was the
case of other experts who addressed the Plan Colombia
conference in February 2001, McCaffrey recognizes in this
monograph that the crux of the drug problem in the United
States is the existence of five million hard-core drug users.
The majority of these are addicted to cocaine. The illegal
trade directed at them alone fuels much of the funding for
the three armed factions which undermine the stability of
Colombia and its neighbors, not to mention the huge level of
criminality generated in the United States.
v

As Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command,
McCaffrey culminated a military career that involved
intimate knowledge of Latin American countries. He was
therefore well placed, during the Clinton administration, to
help devise an appropriate U.S. response to Plan Colombia.
The Congress appropriated an impressive $1.3 billion,
thanks to such efforts. But McCaffrey is quick to tell us that
the Colombian and U.S. solutions are inadequate without
the full support of the rest of Latin America, as well as that
of Europe and Japan. Just as he is optimistic about the
direction of the antidrug campaign in the United States, he
also believes that there is a growing degree of international
cooperation, pointing out the results of the April 2001
Summit of the Americas in Quebec City.
It is not surprising, of course, that he sees U.S.
leadership as the key element in bringing about that
required level of cooperation on a sustained basis. The task
will need tremendous vision and outreach; McCaffrey
speaks of the potential problems faced within the vast
population of China and elsewhere in Asia. His monograph
leaves the question unanswered, since it is no longer his
watch as antidrug “czar,” as to whether this country will be
up to that worldwide challenge.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.
Director
The Dante B. Fascell North-South
Center
University of Miami
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THE DRUG SCOURGE
AS A HEMISPHERIC PROBLEM

Introduction.
Colombia’s 40 million citizens must not be deserted by
their neighbors. Leaving the Colombians to deal in isolation
with a pervasive drug problem will deeply affect all 800
million of us in the Western Hemisphere through addiction,
violence, and corruption. To achieve the degree of
Pan-American solidarity suggested by such a thesis, we
must first build a broad consensus that the drug problem is
indeed hemispheric in its geographical extent, long-term in
its duration, and broad-spectrum in its consequences.
Approaches to the problem must therefore extend beyond
such familiar objects of interstate cooperation as
intelligence, law enforcement, evidence, chemical precursor
control, gun smuggling, and money laundering—though
these are vitally important.
Our approaches must also grow to acknowledge the
enormous social, medical, legal, economic, diplomatic, and
security reverberations that sweep across national borders
and embrace entire populations. Our approaches must
recognize that the ultimate problem is driven not by the
supply of cocaine and heroin, much of which does indeed
come from the bleeding nation of Colombia, but rather by
the demand. That demand emanates mainly from the
United States but also increasingly from Brazil, Venezuela,
Peru, and even Argentina and Chile. Drug corruption,
violence, and addiction gradually spread until all of us are
affected.
Obviously, our approaches will require considerable
time to achieve success, and they must involve the active
cooperation of the entire community of nations. John Donne
once wisely reminded us that no man is an island. He could
as well have spoken of nations themselves, none of which in
1

this crowded world can long escape the contamination of
drug abuse and violence emanating from beyond its shores
and borders. This bedrock reality argues for the absolute
essentiality of a multinational focus. For this reason, we
should be very grateful for the engagement of the
Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations
(U.N.), and the European Union (EU), as well as the
energetic and precisely targeted efforts of the Japanese
government.
In the pages that follow, I shall discuss, in turn, the
following topics: Plan Colombia, the U.S. drug strategy,
international cooperation, and the responsibility of
academia and the think tanks to contribute to solutions.
Plan Colombia.
When we look at the nation of Colombia, most
Americans, accustomed to thinking in terms of the “tiny”
republics down in Central America, are shocked to discover
its enormous size. If you lay a properly scaled map of
Colombia over a map of the contiguous United States, you
will see that Colombia, covering 439,829 square miles, is
over a seventh the size of the original 48. That’s a lot of
physical space to govern and control, considering the few
roads available.
Colombia is blessed with talented, hard-working people,
most of whom have nothing to do with the drug trade.
Drawing on its Spanish heritage, the country enjoys a rich
culture, marked particularly by strong literary and judicial
traditions.
The people of Colombia today, however, find themselves
enmeshed in a singularly unforgiving national tragedy.
Some of the cause is historical, rooted in the desperate
tragedy of La Violencia, which killed 200,000 Colombians in
a decade of mindless violence. Some of it is an inability to
break out of the implacable culture of internal distrust that
has taken root, a distrust that poisons all realms—political,
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economic, social. Despite this, the overwhelming majority of
Colombians are decent people who are appalled by the
violence engulfing their nation. In fact, the most profound
emotion one will find among most Colombians is revulsion
toward the nation’s internal violence. They are trying
desperately to break the cycle of murder and chaos, but they
need help. The stark reality is that they are faced with
several violent groups comprising 26,000 heavily armed
narco-insurgents, and I use that term deliberately. The
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the National
Liberation Army (ELN), the United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC), or simply the “militias,” remain
narco-insurgents plain and simple. The money and power
generated by drugs and rebellion against the established
order constitute their defining essence.
Collectively these groups have been showered with
enormous sums of money—somewhere between a
half-billion and one billion dollars per year—generated by
one of the most evil criminal conspiracies ever known. When
one analyzes the actions of these groups in all their
gruesome detail, we learn that it is not just bank robbery,
kidnapping, extortion, destruction of oil pipelines, mindless
civil violence, intimidation of civil authorities, and the like
with which one has to be concerned. It is also the growing
military capabilities of the narco-insurgents. We are
witnessing the appearance of crisp new soldier uniforms
and sophisticated weaponry. A FARC battalion, for
example, now packs more automatic weapons than a
regular Colombian infantry battalion. These narcoinsurgents now field scores of aircraft and helicopters and
employ 120 mm mortars. These are not isolated bands of
guerrillas. They are organized, led, and equipped to stand
up and fight, and to challenge civil authority on its own
ground. Skeptics should fly to Colombia and look at the
stunning military power in Putumayo Province fielded by
warring factions of the drug trade. The contaminating
effects of the drug-based complex of criminal and violent
activity are by no means confined to Colombia itself, but
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ripple out to infect the region, as well as U.S. cities like
Miami, San Francisco, New York, and Detroit. Ultimately,
every street corner in Hometown America becomes a
tempting target for this global criminal enterprise. The
problem and the solution do not lie only with the
Colombians. The hemisphere is in a state of denial.
The Colombians recognize their centrality to the drug
problem and are trying to organize a coherent national
response. They have a viable government and an operative
democracy. They have political parties and hold regular
elections. They enjoy a long tradition of economic and
political freedom. Perhaps most important, they have
strong political leadership capable of sound strategic
thinking. This must not be a U.S. strategy to solve the drug
problem—the Colombians themselves have to pull together
a solution based on their own political dynamics, and legal
and historical traditions.
We need to remind ourselves that it was President
Andres Pastrana and his government who produced Plan
Colombia. They cobbled it together in an extraordinarily
complex undertaking with our active support. Like most
measures in democratic politics, incrementalism and
factional compromise are frequently the characteristics of
solutions to large, difficult problems. Plan Colombia is not
perfect—but the strategy does represent the deliberate will
of the elected Colombian government in a good-faith effort
to engage this intractable drug problem.
The American team who worked closely with
Undersecretary Tom Pickering and me on Plan Colombia
believes it represents a sound, sensible approach, and we
continue to give it our support. The United States has stated
consistently that Colombia’s regional partners must also
extend cooperation, goodwill, intelligence, and, in some
cases, resources to support a unified regional attack on a
drug tumor that has metastasized well beyond its original
site.
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The U.S. commitment of 1.3 billion dollars in support of
Plan Colombia over the next couple of years is a miniscule
price to pay when measured against the 52,000 American
deaths and 110 billion dollars in damage attributed to the
domestic drug scourge. Many have incorrectly argued that
the U.S. contribution is aimed at a “military solution.”
However, the facts show that U.S. resources flow to several
nations besides Colombia—Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela,
Panama, Ecuador, Curacao, Aruba, and El Salvador.
Furthermore, the money is allocated for a variety of
purposes. For example, more than 240 million dollars of the
total package is allocated to alternative economic
development, strengthening the judicial system, support for
international cooperation, and security for human rights
monitors.
Plan Colombia should be viewed as a work in progress,
one that requires continued debate, careful monitoring, and
mid-course refinements in the light of accumulating
experience. The plan reflects a broad-gauged attempt to
build support in the United States, while at the same time
sustaining support of Colombia’s internal political
constituencies. In addition, we should be cautious about
accepting some news media critics’ characterization of this
plan as controversial. The U.S. funding support of the plan
was passed by Congress with overwhelming bipartisan
support.
I accompanied President William Clinton to Cartagena,
Colombia, in 2000 to meet with the senior officials of the
Pastrana administration. We took with us a bipartisan
congressional delegation that included House Speaker
Dennis Hastert (Republican) and Senator Joseph Biden, Jr.
(Democrat). This visit represented a major effort to
underscore a serious long-term commitment on the part of
the American political leadership to stand with an ally.
Colombians are our friends. They live right next door to us,
and they are in trouble. They have a million internally
displaced people and a half million that have fled the
country. Many are in south Florida, Panama, Canada, and
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Spain. The Colombians benefit the United States
enormously. The families are highly accomplished and
bring bright children, investment capital, and
entrepreneurial savvy. However, the resulting talent drain
from Colombia itself compounds that nation’s problems.
There can be no hemispheric solution unless we stop the
flow of drugs and money that is driving levels of violence
such that Colombia is being drained of its most talented
people.
Under the broad umbrella of Plan Colombia, we can
expect steadily increasing resolve and determination on the
part of the armed forces, police, judges, journalists, and
legislators to defend their country and reimpose control over
their sovereign territory. I believe the plan is going to work.
In the next 2-5 years, we should expect a massive reduction
in the production of drugs on Colombian soil and a
comparable lowering of the level of violence.
U.S. Drug Strategy.
America’s own national drug strategy has been
developed over the past 5 or so years with the advice and
instruction of some very smart and experienced people. To
cite a single example, I would point to Edward T. Foote III,
President of the University of Miami, a distinguished
educator of wide experience who has helped focus national
drug policy on the kinds of prevention, treatment, and
community programs that have produced such spectacular
results in south Florida. Thanks to bipartisan support from
Congress, we now have huge increases in resources focused
on the right areas—prevention (an increase of 58 percent in
5 years), education, and treatment (an increase of 36
percent in 5 years). For example, we are running a
billion-dollar antidrug news media campaign targeting our
young people and their adult mentors in 11 languages. Our
antidrug campaign is tailored uniquely to over 100 separate
regional strategies. The highly successful drug court system
that originated in south Florida now serves as the model for
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other areas of the country. From the original dozen, we now
have over 700 of these special courts on-line or coming
on-line this year. More than 200,000 chronic addicts are
now in treatment, and probably some 70 percent or more
respond with dramatically altered drug-taking behavior.
Our antidrug campaign is working. Adolescent drug use
in this county has declined by 21 percent over the last 2
years alone. The campaign is actually reshaping youth
attitudes, which is a precondition to change in youth
drug-taking behavior. We are also deeply involved in
building community antidrug coalitions around the United
States directed toward creating businesshealth
carelaw enforcement educational coalitions. Over 300
such federally funded coalitions—many of them absolutely
superb examples—have been pulled together over the past
2-plus years. This modest investment in federal money is
changing America. We are definitely moving in the right
direction—America doesn’t have a national drug-problem
we have a series of community drug epidemics.
Drug-related crime is also down dramatically. Drug-related
murders, for example, have declined by 50 percent, while
casual use of cocaine has declined by 70 percent, both over
the past decade. Drug use among Americans (i.e., use
during the month prior to polling), which stood at about 14
percent of the population in 1979, is now down to about 6
percent. It is essential, however, to keep up the pressure and
continue a coherent long-term U.S. national strategy with
the principal focus being on drug prevention and education.
The so-called “war on drugs,” as the pundits so often refer to
it, is not yet won, not by a long shot. Actually, the term war
on drugs is a misnomer in the domestic context. We don’t
wage war on our own children and employees who make bad
personal choices and then find themselves trapped in the
misery, sickness, and illegality of compulsive drug and
alcohol abuse. We need to substitute the more useful
metaphor of a “cancer affecting American communities.”
This leads us to a more accurate conceptual approach for
producing long-term community solutions and effective
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prevention and treatment programs backed up by
unrelenting local law enforcement.
Congress has been sensitive to the nation’s drug problem
and willing to underwrite solutions. It has provided, for
example, a 55 percent increase in dollars going to
prevention programs over the last 5 years. The research
budget has risen by a third, while drug treatment funding
has gone up by 35 percent during that same period.
The analysis, organization, programs, and resources are
all in place. They are going to pay off. In the meantime,
however, we are stuck with five million hard-core addicts
who damage our families and communities as they
gradually destroy their own lives. Some 3.6 million of these
addicts became hooked on cocaine primarily during the
1980s. Ironically, it was during this period that many naïve
and misguided so-called drug experts argued that cocaine
was not an addictive substance. It was thus a palpable shock
to them and their believers to discover that by the late
1980s, nearly four million Americans were hopelessly and
compulsively using this “nonaddictive” drug, which has
such devastating impact on their physical, mental, and
moral health. We now have to deal rationally with these
addicts, all five million of them.
Of course, it’s easy to talk about providing effective drug
treatment for millions of chemically addicted Americans,
but actually establishing the mechanisms for providing the
treatment is uncommonly hard work. Rhetoric is perhaps
useful at the beginning, but when matters come down to the
hands-on phase, then skilled drug treatment providers,
health-care professionals, social workers, criminal justice
representatives, and other community support agencies
must sit down and put together programs in both clinical
and residential settings. Residential treatment puts a
premium upon the tough and essential business of
organizing community follow-on drug treatment care. One
of my favorite such programs is the Village in Miami. This
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superb center can serve as a model for what community
drug treatment endeavors should and can be.
Our U.S. national drug strategy is basically on track. We
have a coherent, long-term approach. Even so, the problem
of successfully dealing with hard-core addiction is so
intractable that we will have to struggle another 10 years to
build the treatment infrastructure we need and to allow our
antidrug prevention and education programs to gradually
reduce the rate of new additions to the roster of those
compulsively using drugs. This shouldn’t discourage us.
We’ve been fighting a campaign against ignorance in this
country for over 200 years and yet we clearly recognize that
educating each generation of adolescents to build antidrug
attitudes is a never-ending task.
International Cooperation.
The climate of international cooperation on the
hemispheric drug problem has improved dramatically over
the past 5-7 years. U.S. drug policy used to be characterized
by mutual recrimination with our international
partners—particularly in our own hemisphere. We have
had excellent support from many senior international
figures; for example, Pino Arlacchi, working the U.N. Drug
Control Program out of Vienna; Kofi Annan, SecretaryGeneral of the U.N.; and Cesar Gaviria, Secretary-General
of the OAS. In addition, we have been grateful for the
partnership offered by the Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission and the various summit meetings of
national leaders from the Americas. All of these leaders
have shown increased recognition that a joint approach to
drugs is absolutely essential if we hope to cooperatively
address not only law enforcement and interdiction—but
also effective cooperative approaches on drug abuse
prevention, treatment and research. We now have some 130
nations that have joined collectively under U.N. auspices to
work to alleviate this global tragedy of drug addiction and
violence.
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The United States views its own campaign against drugs
as part of a global struggle conducted as an integral part of
its foreign policy. The 1996 summit of the Americas in
Santiago, Chile, with strong U.S. leadership, reached a
consensus to build a common strategy for attacking the
problem. Member nations have in fact responded positively
to this mandate. The cooperative approach which was
agreed to by 34 nations in October 1998 in Montevideo,
Uruguay, was further solidified during the Quebec Summit
of the Americas in April 2001. Thirty-four democratic
leaders of the hemisphere agreed with President Bush that
multinational cooperation is better than a series of bipolar
confrontations. The OAS is moving in the right direction.
We hope that the European Union will also recognize the
hard realities of the international drug traffic.
The U.S. Government has been frank with the
Europeans. We have reminded them of the rapidly rising
consumption rate by European citizens of heroin, cocaine,
methamphetamines, ecstacy, and other drugs. Europe, with
a land mass and population approximating that of the
United States, now sees its drug users spending double the
price that Americans pay for a kilogram of cocaine. We
believe some 200-plus metric tons of the drugs were shipped
into Europe during the year 2000 alone. There is rapidly
growing use of cocaine among European youth, which is
beginning to produce a growing addiction problem. It is
going to get worse. The Europeans are not paying adequate
attention to educating their citizens. They like to talk about
police and intelligence cooperation, military cooperation,
and reciprocal extradition protocols; but in my view, their
appreciation of antidrug prevention and education is
inadequate.
I have engaged in some well-documented and frank
public exchanges of views on the drug question with the
Dutch and the Swiss. Personally, I don’t believe the United
States should try too aggressively to change other nations’
internal drug policies so long as those policies are not
adversely affecting our own interests. But I certainly do not
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want to hear Dutch drug legalization suggested as a grand
new model of rational and progressive thinking to be
emulated by the United States. Many of us believe it is an
invitation to disaster to be tolerant of drug use by American
children and society.
The Pacific Rim countries are also now much more
constructively engaged in the drug problem. I led an
interagency U.S. delegation to visit such critical states as
China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand for candid
exchanges of views and information. Thailand is a shining
example of what government resolve can achieve over a
period of 15 years in creating honest national counterdrug
police forces, activating effective national prevention and
treatment programs, and eradicating illicit drug crops.
Thailand now contributes less than 1 percent of the heroin
production of the entire region, certainly a remarkable
record.
The Chinese, we believe, are taking due notice. We
traveled to Beijing, Kunming, and Hong Kong, visiting
senior political leaders, treatment centers, and law
enforcement authorities. Burmese heroin is distributed
throughout China, and it is also going to Europe. We in the
United States don’t have to be as much concerned about
Burmese heroin (the great majority of U.S. heroin now
comes from Colombia and Mexico), but we do need to be
concerned about China as an expansible future market for
the drug. Some 1.266 billion Chinese engulfed in chronic
addiction would be a threatening and destabilizing regional
situation. We need to continue to build on the cooperative
agreements with Chinese authorities that we first
discussed during my June 2000 visit to Beijing. We also had
good conversations with and the promise of cooperation
from both Vietnam and Laos. International communication
and mutuality of effort will continue to improve if we
sustain a skillful and unrelenting diplomatic focus on
building multinational cooperation.
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Responsibility of Academia and the Think Tanks.
Our nation’s policy formulation process—whether
involving the economy, agriculture, highway construction,
international security, etc.—should always include the
contributions of academia, the think tanks, and other
intellectual centers. We need to take the time to check with
serious expert thinkers who have reflected on the knotty
problems associated with the various policy themes. We also
need to base public policy formulation on sound technical
input from experts in specific fields. We should consult the
U.S. Army War College, particularly its Strategic Studies
Institute, and the other senior service colleges.
While we certainly require conceptual clarity, we also
require facts. Facts do not come easily. Policy recommendations must always be grounded on the bedrock of reality.
Conclusion.
My long association with the peoples of Latin America
makes me an optimist. As a young captain serving as
aide-de-camp to the Commanding General of U.S. Army
South, headquartered at Fort Clayton, Republic of Panama,
during 1967-68, I had the unique opportunity to travel to
every country in Central and South America on multiple
occasions. I learned a lot, soaked up as much of the culture
as possible, and practiced my halting West Point Spanish. I
also fell in love with the region. Twenty-six years later, I
returned as Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command,
repeating my earlier travels to all the countries, continuing
to learn as much as I could, still practicing my halting
Spanish. When I retired from that position in 1996 and
joined President Clinton’s Cabinet as the civilian Director of
National Drug Control Policy, I continued a personal
commitment to building cooperative, long-term
multinational approaches to the tough economic, political,
cultural, and criminal problems which face the 800 million
of us in the Americas.
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A career-long affection and respect for the culture,
institutions, and, above all, the people of this vital
neighboring region to our south leaves me feeling confident
that our OAS concept of counterdrug cooperation will, over
time, help build democratic institutions that will better
serve the interests of our people. My own strong belief is
that we will better serve such interests if we continue to help
the people of this region in our hemisphere’s common
struggle against drugs. This is an undertaking in which we
all have an equal stake and an equal responsibility.

13

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert R. Ivany
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven Metz
Author
General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA Retired
Director of Publications
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Christine A. Williams

